Recent concessions in France and in the US have resulted in a dramatic difference in the valuation placed on the toll roads; the price paid by the investors in France was twelve times current cash flow whereas investors paid sixty times current cash flow for the U.S. toll roads. In this paper we explore two questions: What accounts for the difference in these multiples, and what are the implications with respect to the public interest. Our analysis illustrates how structural and procedural decisions made by the public owner affect the concession price. Further, the terms of the concession have direct consequences that are enjoyed or borne by the various stakeholders of the toll road.

Germà Bel (PPRE-IREA), John Foote  Forthcoming in Transport Reviews

XREAP2007-11.pdf

A renewed interest on the use of tolls for funding motorways and regulating their demands has been recovered in the last years. However, less attention has been put to the road safety effects derived from this policy. Although toll motorways show quality levels equal or above free motorways, charging users for the use of better infrastructure shifts some traffic to their low quality adjacent alternatives. In the present study we test whether charging for the use of the better road might negatively affect road safety in the worst adjacent road. The results confirm our hypothesis opening a new concern.

Daniel Albalate (PPRE-IREA)

XREAP2007-09.pdf