The 1998 Spanish reform of the Personal Income Tax eliminated the 15% deduction for private medical expenditures including payments on private health insurance (PHI) policies. To avoid an undesirable increase in the demand for publicly funded health care, tax incentives to buy PHI were not completely removed but basically shifted from individual to group employer-paid policies. In a unique fiscal experiment, at the same time that the tax relief for individually purchased policies was abolished, the government provided for tax allowances on policies taken out through employment. Using a bivariate probit model on data from National Health Surveys, we estimate the impact of said reform on the demand for PHI and the changes occurred within it. Our findings suggest that the total probability of buying PHI was not significantly affected. Indeed, the fall in the demand for individual policies (by 10% between 1997 and 2001) was offset by an increase in the demand for group employer-paid ones, so that the overall size of the market remained virtually unchanged. We also briefly discuss the welfare effects on the state budget, the industry and society at large.
En este documento se analizan comparativamente algunos aspectos relativos al capital humano de la economía catalana y española. En primer lugar se compara la dotación de capital humano tanto desde una metodología más tradicional, como es el caso de años de educación, como desde el punto de vista de la valoración del activo mediante actualización de flujos salariales a lo largo del ciclo vital de los individuos. Los resultados muestran indicios de una cierta desaceleración en el crecimiento del stock de capital humano. Adicionalmente, se lleva a cabo una estimación de la existencia de externalidades de capital humano intra-establecimiento, con datos de la Encuesta de Estructura Salarial, desarrollando una metodología menos restrictiva que la tradicional. Los resultados muestran comportamientos similares de la economía española y catalana, apuntando a la existencia de externalidades.
Josep Lluís Raymond Bara; José Luis Roig Sabaté (GEAP)
It has traditionally been argued that the development of telecommunications infrastructure is dependent on the quality of countries’ political institutions. We estimate the effect of political institutions on the diffusion of three telecommunications services and find it to be much smaller in cellular telephony than in the others. By evaluating the importance of institutions for technologies rather than for industries, we reveal important growth opportunities for developing countries and offer policy implications for alleviating differences between countries in international telecommunications development.
Veneta Andonova; Luis Díaz-Serrano (CREB-GRIT-IZA)
The objective of the research is to know the factors that in Spain influence in the election of banking organization. The obtained results indicate that the dimension of the network of branches is the reason more valued. In spite of the increasing symmetry of the Spanish banking market, the preferences of the clients of the savings banks and those of the banks are not absolutely coincident, being the proximity – the main reason for election- much more valued by the former than by the latter. The existence of divergences in the preferences has also been detected according to the region and the typology of city of residence.
Antoni Garrido Torres (IEB), Pere Arqué Castells (IEB)