PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP MANAGEMENT EFFECTS ON ROAD SAFETY OUTCOMES

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Public Private Partnership management effects on road safety outcomes

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ABSTRACT

Public Private Partnerships (PPP) have become common in providing high-quality infrastructure in many countries worldwide. One of the main reasons for PPP agreements is to improve efficiency and quality in the delivery of public services, as well as to boost investments for expensive projects. Despite PPPs having been particularly widespread in the case of the construction and rehabilitation of high-capacity road infrastructure, their impact in terms of road safety outcomes is still unexplored. This paper studies the effects of PPPs on road safety outcomes by taking advantage of the variety of management models provided in the Spanish highway network. Results based on a panel-data fixed-effects method show that the most relevant aspect influencing road safety outcomes is the quality of design of the road. However, we find strong evidence suggesting that privately operated highways perform better in terms of road safety outcomes than publicly operated highways, for roads with a similar quality of design.

KEYWORDS: Public Private Partnership, highway, road safety, management

JEL CODES: H23, I18, I33

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1. INTRODUCTION

Road accidents are among the main causes of death around the world. According to the World Health Organization (2015), more than 1.2 million people die every year on the roads, and for each person that dies there are at least 20 others that sustain nonfatal injuries, as a result of traffic crashes. Apart from the human suffering, the economic costs associated with these tragedies are high in terms of health spending, insurance costs, productivity losses and congestion costs. The last estimates of the European Commission (2010) calculate that 130 billion euros - approximately 2% of the GDP - are economic costs associated with road accidents. More recently, the International Road Assessment Program (2015) has found that the global economic cost of road deaths and serious injuries is about 1.8 trillion dollars per year in the world, an average of 3% of the GDP in each country.

There is a collective public interest in improving global road safety. Nonetheless, road transport remains as one of the most dangerous modes of transport. In 2015, in the European Union alone, the total number of fatalities from road accidents was 26,134, while from railways and airplanes the number of lives lost was just 27 and 150, respectively.1 Improving road safety is linked to lower social and economic costs and more sustainable development. Therefore, multitudinous initiatives are currently being taken by transport authorities worldwide.

From 1990 to 2015 governments around the world have awarded more than 950 PPP road projects with a total amount of investment of 267,039 million dollars.2 In many developed and developing countries, PPPs are an important and attractive alternative for financing and managing road highways (Engel et al., 2003; Bel and Foote, 2009; Albalate, 2014). One of the most common strategies proposed by policy makers to reach better road safety outcomes has been to upgrade the quality of the roads. Nevertheless, public debt burden and fiscal stress have led governments to find ways of achieving better roads without compromising the state’s accountability. The provision of better roads through public private partnership (PPP) has become almost normal practice to circumvent budgetary restrictions (Hammami et al., 2006; Albalate et al., 2017). Thus, governments

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1 Eurostat database. Data for 28 EU Member States.
2 The World Bank database.
find an ally in the private sector to meet the challenge of providing new and better road infrastructure.

Another important argument for the implementation of PPPs has been to increase economic efficiency (Grimsey and Lewis, 2002; World Bank, 2012). Given that the private sector is profit-making, the lifecycle costs should be optimized. However, within the property rights theory of ownership based on incomplete contracting, it has been argued that although private management may improve productive performance it may harm the quality of services (Hart et al., 1997; Hart, 2003), and indirectly, the safety outcomes of the service delivered. Supporters of private management claim that the private sector can provide public services more efficiently than governments, but critics claim that private companies will prioritize economic revenues over the quality and safety of services. Empirical evidence of the productive performance of road investment, as between PPPs and traditional procurement, is limited and findings show mixed results (Blanc-Brude et al., 2009; Raisbek et al., 2010; Chasey et al., 2012).

However, other scholars argue that it is precisely the drive to improve the quality of services that brings about PPPs (Harris, 2004; Hodge and Greve, 2007). According to the European Commission (2003), the quality of services achieved under PPPs is better than traditional procurement due to the fact that the private sector introduces innovation in service delivery, promotes better integration of services, improves economies of scale and allows performance-based contracts. Nevertheless, there is a lack of empirical evidence of the relationship between quality and ownership or management models, particularly where road safety is concerned.

Indeed, an improved design and maintenance of roads would reduce accidents and provide users with more efficient mobility, comfort and lower vehicle operating costs (Burningham and Stankevich, 2005). Moreover, some practitioners suggest that there are fewer accidents on private roads than public roads (Samuel and Poole, 2000; Sisiopiku et al., 2006; Block, 2009), advocating for the road safety benefits of PPPs. Contrarily, others advise that private management can be more costly and might lead to problems with safety and quality (Kusnet, 2007). However, the effects of management on quality measured in road safety outcomes have not yet been deeply analyzed.
In this paper we aim to shed light on this gap by analyzing empirically the effects of management models (PPPs vs. public management) on road safety outcomes in Spain, where there is a mix of management models composed of publicly managed highways and those privately managed under PPP agreements. We apply different count data models, within the framework of panel-data econometric techniques, in order to evaluate the role of management models on the determination of the number of accidents with victims and the number of victims (casualties).

The remainder of the article is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a literature review on PPPs and road safety. Section 3 defines the Spanish mixed model of highway management that allows us to compare both management models within the same network and countrywide experience. Section 4 provides the data and variables used and the empirical strategy employed. Results are presented in Section 5. In Section 6 we conclude.

2. LITERATURE ON PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS AND ROAD SAFETY

2.1. Public-Private Partnership: A definition

A public private partnership (PPP) can be broadly defined as a contractual agreement between public administration and at least one private company, in which the private party is engaged to finance, build or rehabilitate and manage a project through a long-term contractual agreement until the contract expires and the asset returns to public ownership (Grimsey and Lewis, 2004).

However, there are several aspects to this concept that include some common features. Firstly, a PPP is a cooperative activity between the public and private sectors (Osborne, 2002; Van Ham and Koppenjan, 2001). Secondly, risks are shared between parties (HM Treasury, 2003; OECD, 2008). Thirdly, various tasks are bundled under the same contract (Grimsey and Lewis, 2004; Hodge et al., 2010). Fourthly, these contracts can take many forms\(^3\) such as; build, operate and transfer (BOT),

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\(^3\) Industrial organization requires that to be considered a PPP the bundling of construction and operation must be under the same contract (Martimort and Pouyet, 2008; Bennett and Iossa, 2006).
build, own, operate and transfer (BOOT), design, build, finance and operate (DBOT), and rehabilitate, operate and transfer (ROT) (GAO, 1999; World Bank, 2012). Fifthly, two types of infrastructure investment are available in PPP projects: greenfields and brownfields. Investing in a new infrastructure asset is considered as a greenfield project and investing in an existing asset at the operational phase is a brownfield project. Greenfield assets have high levels of business, construction and demand risks, while brownfield investments are perceived to be the lowest-return and lowest-risk sector of infrastructure investment (Bitsch et al., 2010). Therefore, operational risk on brownfield projects should be smaller than in greenfield investment due to the asset having been working for some time.

2.2. Public-Private Partnerships and road safety outcomes

Although the empirical literature has not explored the direct impact of PPPs on road safety, we can identify two strands of related literature. On the one hand, research on the role of tolls in producing traffic shift onto alternative roads (re-routing effects). On the other hand, research exploring the influence of the introduction of performance-based incentives in road management contracts.

Re-routing effects and road safety

Re-routing literature provides evidence that road accidents are higher on roads that are alternatives to tolled highways, due to the fact that charging for the use of the better road may encourage too many drivers to choose alternative free minor roads, which are generally of poorer quality or not prepared to receive high amounts of traffic. This literature is connected to our work in the sense that PPPs are generally associated with user payments via tolls, even though other PPP models may involve shadow tolls, which are not charged to users but to taxpayers. Publicly operated highways might also charge tolls to users, as is common in the United States and was common in some European countries such as France, Italy and Portugal before the privatization of their networks.

One of the earliest works is Lyles et al. (1990). This study evaluates the crash frequency and crash rate of large trucks in Michigan. The most significant findings were that crash rates were five to
seven times higher on lowest class roadways than those on the controlled access system. Similarly, a recent study, also for the US, by Swan and Belzer (2013), estimates the crash cost per vehicle mile traveled for trucks that diverted from the Ohio Turnpike to avoid paying tolls. Results show that crash costs are highest for the roads to which truck traffic was diverted.

In Europe we also find similar studies. Broughton and Gower (1998) analyzed the effects of motorway tolls on the number of accidents in the United Kingdom. Results show that a 10% diversion of motorway traffic from the toll motorways in Kent would increase the number of accidents in the entire county by about 3.5%. In this same line of research, Albalate (2011) tests whether charging for the use of highways might negatively affect road safety outcomes on the adjacent free roads. The author found that road accidents in Spain are higher on routes adjacent to toll motorways than those adjacent to free motorways, controlling for traffic and other potential determinants of road safety. And more recently, Baumgarten and Middelkamp (2015) analyzed the impact of the implementation of the German heavy good vehicle toll and the re-routing effects on road safety outcomes. Results of this study indicate that interurban toll charging causes traffic diversion, producing a negative impact on Germany’s road safety outcomes.

Finally, at a national scale, we find the work by Albalate and Bel (2012), which investigates the relationship between different types of road quality and their impact on national safety outcomes in Europe. Their findings suggest that, distinguishing between free and tolled motorways, the former were associated with a statistically significant reduction in traffic fatalities, probably as a consequence of the re-routing effect.

**Public-private partnership and safety incentives in contracts**

Some theoretical approaches to PPPs hold that the introduction of performance-based incentives in road management contracts may contribute to improving road safety outcomes (Grimsey and Lewis, 2007). However, empirical analyses of these effects are scarce and limited to few works.
This literature is based on the assumption that many aspects of improving road safety, for example pavement maintenance and renewal, safety emergency assistance, safety equipment, etc., can be introduced into the contract through an incentive mechanism.

As far as we know, empirical studies on this incentive scheme in road contracts can only be found for the case of Spain. By using a dataset with public and private highways in a cross-section setting for the year 2006, Rangel et al. (2012) found that there are more fatalities, injuries and accidents on highways without road safety incentives than on highways with incentives. Also, Rangel et al. (2013) evaluated incentive schemes by using data only from private highways between 2007 and 2009, finding that road incentives are significant factors reducing the number of accidents and injuries but not decreasing the number of fatalities. More recently, Rangel and Vassallo (2015) expanded the previous dataset, including all types of highways - not only private but also public - confirming that there are more accidents on highways without incentives than those with incentives.4

Some of these papers included a variable controlling for the road management model. However, it was not the main focus of their analyses (see Rangel et al., 2012 and Rangel and Vassallo, 2015). These papers conclude that toll highways (privately managed) are safer than the second generation of public highways. However, in the case of Rangel et al. (2012) results indicated that the first generation of public highways, is safer than the second generation of public highways. This result was considered by the authors as an odd feature of their findings and, subsequently, it was reversed in Rangel and Vassallo (2015).

The contribution of this paper to the literature is twofold. Firstly, it differs from the previous research on re-routing by exploring the direct safety effect on the road managed by the private manager, and not on the adjacent alternative roads stressed by the diversion of traffic. Secondly, we provide a panel-data econometric estimation to explore the role of the management model on road safety outcomes, distinguishing by the quality of design of roads in a long panel-data fixed-effects model. Therefore, we separate the quality of road design into different tiers which allows us to make a more robust comparison between the private and public management models, avoiding the

4 This paper dismisses the use of a panel-data specification arguing that spatial and temporal correlation problems were not expected in the sample analyzed.
bias produced by the different engineering qualities of the infrastructure. Thus, our results should not be influenced by the construction design.

3. THE SPANISH MIXED ROAD NETWORK

The highway network management in Spain is quite singular compared to most European countries. Spain has a long tradition of building and managing road highways through PPPs. However, since the end of the 80s different types of management can be found (Bel and Fageda, 2005; Albalate et al., 2009; Albalate, 2014). The first private highways were awarded in Spain at the end of the 60s. Having overcome the hardest years of the autarky, the Spanish economy was growing fast but transportation infrastructures were insufficient for productive activities. An expanded and modern highway network was required at a time when the public budget was insufficient to afford such investment. The government opted for private funding and by the second half of the 70s more than 1,800 km of private highways were already constructed.

In the early 80s, the democratic transition and the oil crisis increased the financial expenses and construction costs, bringing the private highway expansion work to a halt. However, a large number of kilometers of the Spanish network was single and dual carriageways and the growth of the highway network was still necessary. The new government that took office in 1982 and remained until 1996 − politically opposed to continued expansion of the highway network with private participation − approved the first program of public highways and started to build the first generation of publicly managed free highways. However, this first generation of free highways was constructed by doubling existing carriageways. The three main reasons for doubling were economics (to take advantage of the existing road), traffic flow (private highways had not solved the traffic congestion on the adjacent roads), and safety (highways are safer) (Sánchez et al., 2007).

At the end of the 80s more than 2,000 km of first generation free highways were already constructed but the geometric design of the roads (road design) was inferior to that of private highways.

In 1993 the government terminated the first program of public highways although the expansion of the network continued to develop but without doubling the existing carriageways. In 1996 the government changed and interest in private financing of highways was renewed. From 1996 to 2006 more than 800 km of private highways were already awarded. Nevertheless, the government continued constructing public highways. At the end of 2006 the Spanish highway network totaled around 9,700 km. Private operators managed 2,700 km and the public sector 7,000 km (2,000 km of which correspond to first generation public highways, and the remaining 5,000 km to the second generation).

Since 2006 to the present day, no more private construction has been commissioned. However, at the end of 2007, against the backdrop of an increase in the traffic flow, velocity and number of accidents on the first generation of public highways, there was a need to find a formula that made it possible for the government to finance the necessary actions, and so 1,000 km of the first generation of public highways were transferred to private companies for a period of 19 years.

Nowadays, 24% of the total highway network is managed by private companies and 76% by the public sector. However, the first generation of public highways – 50% managed by private operator and 50% by the public sector – has inferior geometric design than the private motorways and the second generation of public highways. Table 1 shows the length of the Spanish highway (RCE) by road operator and quality of the geometric design of roads.

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8 In 1999 the state modified the technical normative. See Order 2107/1999 of the 27th December (BOE, 27/12/1999).
9 See PEIT (2005).
10 In September 2012, an additional 49 km of public highways were transferred to private operators. However, in this study, we have not counted these 49 km as privately managed because the data we analyzed are from 2008 to 2012.
Table 1. Spanish highway composition by road operator and quality of road design

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>Kilometers</th>
<th>% of km</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public High</td>
<td>7566</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Low</td>
<td>1054</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Public</strong></td>
<td><strong>8620</strong></td>
<td><strong>76%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private High</td>
<td>1717</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Low</td>
<td>1042</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Private</strong></td>
<td><strong>2759</strong></td>
<td><strong>24%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>11379</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Own elaboration

As we can see in Table 1, 82% of Spanish highways have high construction quality: 67% managed by the public sector (public_h) and 15% by a private operator (private_h). High-quality public highways have separated carriageways for each direction of circulation, have limited access to neighboring properties, do not cross any other path and offer free access to road users. In contrast, high-quality private highways have different carriageways for each direction of circulation separated from each other, have no access to neighboring properties, do not cross any other path, are exclusively for car traffic and only offer access to users by a direct toll.

Of the 18% of highways that are classified as of low quality of construction, half are publicly managed (public_l) and the other half by private operators (private_l). These low-quality highways have the same road design characteristics because both belong to the first generation of public highways which were constructed by doubling existing conventional carriageways. That being said, low-quality private highways have undergone some conditional improvements since their privatization at the end of 2007. Nonetheless, they may never reach the benchmark high quality of design due to the initial geometrical design that cannot be substantially modified.

We choose to analyze the case of Spain because of the particular mixed model of management that allows for a comparison between private and public management models within the same national network. Thus, we are able to compare different forms of delivery with similar road designs. This allows us to better pinpoint the true effects of management on road safety performance.
4. METHODS AND DATA

4.1. Methodology

The most common methodology for modeling road accidents is based on count models because the nature of accident occurrence is random, discrete, non-negative and does not follow a normal (Gaussian) distribution. Different approaches have been applied to evaluating road safety determinants. Many different prediction models are available for estimating the number of accidents linked to a set of exogenous variables (see Lord and Mannering, 2010; Mannering and Bhat, 2014). Given the characteristics of the outcome variables described above, count-data regression models based on a Poisson or on a negative binomial distribution are the most commonly used. Nevertheless, a strong restriction of the Poisson model is that the mean and the variance have to be equal. This is the so-called equidispersion assumption. Unfortunately, this assumption is often violated when variance exceeds the mean, which indicates overdispersion in the data. It is when count data display overdispersion that the negative binomial regression model is more appropriate (Miaou and Lum, 1993; Hadi et al., 1995; Abdel-Aty and Radwan, 2000; Lord, 2006). The negative binomial distribution allows for a more flexible modeling of the variance than the Poisson model and ensures the avoidance of biased standard errors and inefficient estimated coefficients.

Since the seminal paper of Hausman et al. (1984), panel count models have been applied in road safety analysis in order to correct for unobservable time-invariant heterogeneity. Poisson and negative binomial panel data have been used in both random effects and fixed effects alternatives (Noland, 2003; Chin and Qudud, 2003; Yaacob et al., 2011; Hosseinpour et al., 2014). The random-effects model assumes that the individual effects are uncorrelated with the independent variables. If this is the case, then the random-effects model is unbiased, consistent and more efficient than the fixed-effects model. If the unobserved individual heterogeneity is correlated with the exogenous variables, then the random-effects model will produce inconsistent estimates. In this

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11 If the distribution of counts contains a much larger than expected number of zeros, Zero Inflated models are more appropriate (Lord et al., 2005b).
case the fixed-effects model, which always provides consistent estimates – but is less efficient than the random-effects model - is the most reliable choice.

### 4.2. Model choice

Our data on road accidents are collected in panel form (846 control stations followed for 5 years, from 2008 to 2012) and a simple pooled Poisson model is first employed as a benchmark model. In the Poisson model, the assumption of independent observations over individual control stations and across time is consistent with the strong assumption that the mean and the variance have to be equal. The Wald test and the Likelihood Ratio tests allows us to reject the null hypothesis of no overdispersion, thus we conduct a pooled negative binomial regression as a preferred model. We assume that individual effects are independent across control stations for a given year but note that individual effects can be correlated over time for a given control station. For this reason, panel-data models should be more appropriate than pooled models. The Likelihood Ratio test is used to check whether the data are better modeled using a panel structure or a pooled estimator with constant overdispersion. Results corroborate the reasoning that a panel structure is more appropriate.

As described above, in order to consider differences across control stations, two approaches can be used: random effects and fixed effects. In this study, both panel random-effects and fixed-effects negative binomial regression models have been applied and compared. Because we have some unobserved time invariant characteristics of the infrastructure variables such as lane widths, road curvature, and intersections that may violate the strict exogeneity assumption required for random effects, the recommended model used must be fixed effects. Notwithstanding the above, we conduct the Hausman test and results allow us to reject the null hypothesis of no systematic differences between the two models. This is the same as confirming the correlation between unobserved heterogeneity and the regressors, which indicates that the conditional fixed-effects negative binomial model is the only one ensuring consistent results.

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12 The $\chi^2$ statistic of the Wald test rejects the null hypothesis with a $p$-value=0.000. The $\chi^2$ statistic of the LR test rejects the null hypothesis with a $p$-value=0.000.

13 The $\chi^2$ statistic of the LR test rejects the null hypothesis with a $p$-value=0.000.
In spite of the suitability of the fixed-effects negative binomial model there have been two different formulations. Firstly, the conditional estimation of fixed-effects negative binomial model developed by Hausman et al. (1984). Secondly, the unconditional estimation of fixed-effects negative binomial model proposed by Allison and Waterman (2002) and Greene (2007). The main difference is that in the conditional fixed-effects negative binomial model, the fixed effects enter the model through the dispersion parameter rather than the conditional mean function adopted by unconditional estimation. The conditional fixed-effects modeling implies that the time invariant variable can coexist with the effects, therefore time invariant variables are not dropped out from the model. Because the main variable of interest in this study is management, which is time invariant, the appropriate estimator is the conditional fixed-effects negative binomial model. In addition, using the conditional fixed-effects estimator, the incidental parameters problem (panel level heterogeneity) is avoided because the likelihood function is conditioned for each observed panel outcome by the sum of the counts for that panel. Once we eliminate the panel level heterogeneity, applying usual asymptotic theory with fixed time, and observations tending to infinity, the conditional fixed-effects estimator is consistent.

In order to obtain empirically the effects of management on road safety in the Spanish highway network, the following reduced form equation is estimated, employing the conditional two-way fixed-effects negative binomial model:

\[ Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_{\text{manage}} + \delta X_{it} + \mu_i + \gamma_t + \epsilon_{it} \]

where the dependent variable \(Y_{it}\) is a count of accidents (acc_with) or victims (vic) in control station \(i\) and year \(t\), \(\alpha\) is the constant term in the model. The main variable in the estimation is \(\text{manage}_i\) which identifies whether the highway is managed by the public administration or by a private manager. In a disaggregated model we substitute this variable with four other variables: high-quality public highway (public_h), low-quality public highway (public_l), high-quality private highway (private_h) or low-quality private highway (private_l). \(X_i\) is the vector of road safety standard determinants, \(\mu_i\) is the control station-specific fixed effect from which we obtain the
locally specific road safety data and \( y_t \) is the year-specific fixed effect. Finally, \( e_{it} \) is the error term.

The subscripts \( i \) and \( t \) define the cross-section and the time dimension of our data, respectively.

In the equation the number of counts \( y_{it} \) is assumed to follow a negative binomial distribution with \( E(y_{it}) = \Theta_i \lambda_{it} \) and \( \text{var}(y_{it}) = (1 + \Theta_i)\Theta_i \lambda_{it} \) where \( \lambda_{it} = \exp(X_{it}'\beta) \) and \( \Theta_i = \alpha_i / \phi_i \). As previously defined, \( \alpha_i \) is the individual specific fixed effects and \( \phi_i \) is the negative binomial overdispersion parameter which can vary across individual effects and can take any value. Nevertheless, to estimate the parameters for the fixed-effects negative binomial model, the overdispersion parameter \( \phi_i \) has been dropped out for conditional maximum likelihood.\(^{14}\)

Furthermore, we use the exposure variable \( \text{vehikm}_{it} \) because it is known that traffic flow varies from one control station to another and the total annual vehicles per km traveled could affect the count.\(^{15}\) This means that the outcome variable needs a rate which is just a count per unit of vehicles/km traveled. The negative binomial manages exposure variables by using natural logarithms to change the outcome variable from a rate into a count. The exposure variable is entered in the log link function as the natural logarithm and it is required to have a fixed coefficient equal to one. The coefficient of one allows turning the count into a rate.

### 4.3. Data and variables

**Data**

This study draws on a dataset extracted from the Spanish traffic map database (Mapa de tráfico, 2012) published annually by the Spanish General Traffic Directorate. The database is generated from two different sources. Traffic data are supplied by the Ministry of Public Works. Road accidents data are provided by the Ministry of Homeland Affairs, responsible for road safety in Spain. Accidents data cover all reported accidents with at least one person injured, recording the number of injuries and number of deaths, at the moment that the accident occurs, in segments belonging to different road categories of the state road network (RCE). The Spanish RCE on traffic

\(^{14}\) See Cameron and Trivedi (2005).

\(^{15}\) For example, a count of 15 annual number of accidents with victims out of 50 million of vehicles per km traveled is much smaller than a count of 15 out of 10.
map 2012 is segmented in 4,788 homogeneous lengths of 5.44 km. In each segment there is a control station that records annual and historical information on accidents, injuries and fatalities, and traffic mix. Since we are merely interested on high capacity roads, we avoid using data related to two undivided dual carriageway and single carriageway roads. In order to avoid selection bias we considered interurban and urban segmented road stretches with and without accidents recorded. Therefore, a total of 4,234 highway control stations were extracted out of 5,528 from the 2008 to 2012 database. Control stations without complete information for safety outcomes and traffic flow were excluded. The traffic map database also includes information on infrastructure characteristics such as number of lanes.

**Dependent variables**

The count dependent variables considered in this study are the annual number of accidents with victims (acc_with) and the annual number of victims (vic) recorded in each control station. The variable annual number of victims is the sum of the annual number of injuries and the annual number of fatalities. We aggregate injuries and fatalities in one variable because data on injuries and fatalities are recorded at the moment the accident occurs. If a victim does not immediately die, we cannot identify if she finally dies because of the accident. Information on these variables has been obtained from the 2012 traffic map database.

The main variable of interest in this study is management (manage), however as we are interested in estimating the true effects of management, a quality categorization of the geometric design of roads has been conducted. Of the total highway network 24% is managed by private companies and the remaining 76% by the public sector. However, the geometric design of roads differs. The variable management is introduced in the model as a binary variable that identifies whether the road is managed by a private manager (value 1), or under public management (value 0). This variable, once it is disaggregated to deal with the different quality of design, is substituted by four binary variables. The high-quality public highway (public_h), low-quality public highway (public_l), high-quality private highway (private_h) or low-quality private highway (private_l). All of these are dummy variables. Thus, we need to drop out one of them to avoid perfect collinearity, and coefficients
must be interpreted with respect to the variable excluded from the model. All information on these variables is obtained from the 2012 traffic map database and from the 2012 Spanish toll highways annual report. Also, we take advantage of the research conducted by Sánchez et al. (2007) to identify the low-quality public highways. Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of the dependent variables by operator and quality of the road design.

### Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the dependent variables by operator and quality of road design

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operator</th>
<th>acv1</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Obs</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>S.D.</td>
<td>Min</td>
<td>Max</td>
<td>Obs</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>S.D.</td>
<td>Min</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>3141</td>
<td>22.14</td>
<td>48.97</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1498</td>
<td>3138</td>
<td>34.97</td>
<td>63.55</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public_H</td>
<td>2592</td>
<td>19.54</td>
<td>37.05</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>2590</td>
<td>31.23</td>
<td>58.24</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public_L</td>
<td>549</td>
<td>34.47</td>
<td>82.06</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1498</td>
<td>548</td>
<td>52.62</td>
<td>82.01</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>1093</td>
<td>14.54</td>
<td>28.44</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>1093</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privat_H</td>
<td>729</td>
<td>7.87</td>
<td>13.04</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>729</td>
<td>13.24</td>
<td>21.41</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privat_L</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>27.91</td>
<td>42.71</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>47.04</td>
<td>69.25</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4234</td>
<td>20.18</td>
<td>44.22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1498</td>
<td>4231</td>
<td>32.26</td>
<td>59.76</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Exogenous variables**

Our empirical model of road safety determinants must build on the grounds of previous research. It is well known that personal income, traffic conditions, infrastructure features, weather conditions and road users’ behavior might affect road accidents.

There has been significant interest on the relation between road accidents and traffic conditions such as traffic flows (Martin, 2002; Lord et al., 2005a; Anastasopoulos and Mannering, 2009), traffic mix (Albalate, 2011; Castillo-Manzano et al., 2016) and speed of driving (Nilsson, 2004; Pei et al., 2012; Quddus, 2013). On the one hand, most studies reveal a positive relationship between accidents and traffic flow and traffic mix (Wang et al., 2013). However, other studies found that heavy vehicles do not seem to be associated with poorer road safety outcomes (Albalate, 2011; Castillo-Manzano et al., 2016). Thus, our model will control the number of vehicles per km (vehi_km) and the percentage of heavy vehicles (heavy_vehi). The variable *vehi_km* is defined as \[ \text{vehi} = \text{total average annual daily traffic} \times \text{length of segment} \times 365. \] The variable *heavy_vehi* is the
percentage of heavy vehicles in the total average annual daily traffic. Both variables are obtained through data compiled in the 2012 traffic map database. Also, we include the average age of the vehicle fleet of the province (age_vehi). The variable age_vehi was elaborated from data provided by the Spanish General Traffic Directorate.

On the other hand, the impact of variation in speed on road safety has been widely investigated but results suggest that speed has heterogeneous effects on road safety (Wang et al., 2013; Imprialou et al., 2006) and no conclusive results are derived. Because we could not confirm this as a variable our model does not contribute to the debate on the role of speed.

Road design is another factor that needs to be taken into account when analyzing road safety. Several researchers have focused on analyzing the relationship between accidents and a variety of different features of the infrastructure such as lane widths, number of traffic lanes, median shoulder, pavement, road curvature, intersections and signalization (Abdel-Aty and Radwan, 2000; Noland and Oh, 2004; Meuleneres et al., 2008). In general terms, results conclude that the road’s characteristics have a statistically significant impact on safety (Albalate et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2013). Thus, improvements in road infrastructure have a positive effect in protecting users (Pérez, 2006; Gomes and Cardoso, 2012). In order to control for infrastructure features we include the number of lanes and the type of road - depending on whether it is an urban road or interurban road. This is introduced by including the variable interurban, which is a dummy variable taking value 1 for control stations placed in interurban sections and 0 otherwise. This is the only physical feature that we can include because information on these aspects is very limited in the traffic map database.

Climate and weather conditions have also been important variables in analyses of road safety investigation. Most studies show that conditions such as rainfall affect accident outcomes (Eisenberg, 2004; Hermans et al., 2006; Caliendo et al., 2007). For this reason we include in our equation of determinants the annual number of rainy days. The variable rainy is the annual average number of rainy days by province. Data were provided by the Spanish State Meteorological Agency.
It is widely known that individual driving behavior is a crucial determinant of road accidents. Among others, alcohol consumption, speeding or non-use of seat belt cause more accidents and might increase their seriousness. Many analyses of the effectiveness of enforcement laws such as speed limits, legal limits of blood alcohol content and seat belt laws have been carried out in recent years (Loeb, 2001; Dee et al., 2005; Albalate, 2008). Results suggest that the impact of laws and regulations may depend on the driving population under examination (Albalate et al., 2013). We therefore include variables of demographic characteristics of the population as in the number of young people between 20-29 years old (\( \text{pop}_{20-29} \)) and the elderly population above 80 years old \( (\text{pop}_{>80}) \). In addition, we include the number of liters of alcohol consumed per capita at home \( (\text{alcohol}_{pc}) \) to account for the risk of drunk driving.

We also include the GDP per capita in order to account for the importance of income as a determinant of road accidents.

Data for all of the socio-economic variables are desegregated by province except for the variable \( \text{alcohol}_{pc} \), which is only available by autonomous community. The variable \( \text{GDP}_{pc} \) and the variables \( \text{pop}_{20-29} \) and \( \text{pop}_{>80} \) were collected from the Spanish National Statistics Institute database. The variable \( \text{alcohol}_{pc} \) was obtained from the Spanish Ministry of Industry.

Table 3 provides information for the descriptive statistics of all these control variables.
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of control variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>interurban</td>
<td>Dummy</td>
<td>0.861994</td>
<td>0.344941</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lanes</td>
<td>Number of lanes by control station</td>
<td>4.304503</td>
<td>0.866894</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>heavy_vehi</td>
<td>Percentage of heavy vehicles from the total AADT by control station</td>
<td>14.93672</td>
<td>8.619115</td>
<td>0.934113</td>
<td>61.22128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vehi_km</td>
<td>Total AADT* length of segment * 365 by control station</td>
<td>51800000</td>
<td>51300000</td>
<td>176718.4</td>
<td>3.14E+08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP_pc</td>
<td>Annual GDP per capita at current prices by province</td>
<td>21279.37</td>
<td>4257.559</td>
<td>14763</td>
<td>37675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>alcohol_pc</td>
<td>Annual litres alcohol consumption per capita inside of home by regions</td>
<td>23.5958</td>
<td>3.577236</td>
<td>15.62</td>
<td>34.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age_vehi</td>
<td>Total average age vehicle fleets by province</td>
<td>11.52345</td>
<td>1.002196</td>
<td>9.09857</td>
<td>14.23427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pop_20a29</td>
<td>Total population driving age between 20 and 29 year old by province</td>
<td>177262.2</td>
<td>223154.8</td>
<td>10134</td>
<td>934239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pop_&gt;80</td>
<td>Total population driving age older than 80 year old by province</td>
<td>64405.79</td>
<td>70338.2</td>
<td>8577</td>
<td>295942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rainy</td>
<td>Annual average number of rainy days by province</td>
<td>94.7201</td>
<td>40.59686</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>203.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As a result, our main equation is the following:

\[
Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta manage_{it} + \delta_1 interurban_{it} + \delta_2 lanes_{it} + \delta_3 heavy\_vehi_{it} + \delta_4 GDP\_pc_{it} \\
+ \delta_5 alcohol\_pc_{it} + \delta_6 age\_vehi_{it} + \delta_7 pop\_20a29_{it} + \delta_8 pop>80_{it} \\
+ \delta_9 rainy_{it} + \gamma_{10} year_{it} + \mu_i + \epsilon_{it}
\]

Where,

\( interurban_{it} \) is a dummy variable with value one for highways belonging to interurban environment and vale 1 for those placed in urban areas.

\( lanes_{it} \): is the number of lanes for each segment.

\( heavy\_vehi_{it} \) is the percentage of heavy vehicles from the total AADT by control station.

\( GDP\_pc_{it} \): is the annual GDP per capita at current prices by province.
alcohol_{pcit}: is the annual liters alcohol consumption per capita inside of home by regions.

age_{vehiit}: is the average vehicle fleet age by provinces.

pop_{20a29it}: is the total population driving age between 20 and 29 year old by province.

pop_{>80it}: is the total population driving age older than 80 years old by provinces.

rainy_{it}: is the annual average number of rainy days by province.

\mu_i: is the control station fixed effects and

\gamma_t: is the year-specific fixed effect

\varepsilon_{it} is the error term.

5. RESULTS

In this section we present the effects of management models on two road safety outcomes: the annual number of accidents with victims (acc_{with}) and the annual number of victims (vic). We first estimate pooled count data in both Poisson and negative binomial models, after that we conduct panel negative binomial estimations with random effects and conditional fixed effects. Table 4 reports the coefficient estimates for the four models regressed for both dependent variables (acc_{with} and vic). A positive sign indicates an increase in the annual number of accidents with victims (acc_{with}) and the annual number of victims (vic), whereas a negative sign indicates a decrease. Recall that our preferred model is the conditional fixed-effects model.

As we can see in Table 4, the expected number of accidents and victims for the variable management (manage), is statistically significant and negative for all the models regressed. Private management is associated with a lower number of accidents and victims. However, this result could be biased if private management is more present in roads with high-quality design. Therefore, we disaggregate the management variable into three variables indicating the interaction between the
management model and the quality of the road. Results of this analysis are reported in **Table 5** for the four models regressed and for both dependent variables (acc_with and vic). The results associated with the variables related to management and quality must be interpreted with respect to the category excluded, to avoid perfect collinearity. In our case, the benchmark variable excluded is *public_h*.

Results show that the annual number of accidents with victims (acc_with) and the annual number of victims (vic) decrease when the quality of the road design is high. It means that highways with high-quality road design are safer than those with low quality design, as expected. Thus, it is clear that beyond the management model, the quality of design is a major determinant of road safety. As a consequence, any comparison must take into account the homogeneity of quality of design to evaluate differences caused by the management model.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Dependent Variable (acc_with) and Selected Model</th>
<th>Dependent Variable (vic)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poison</td>
<td>NegBin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-11.82***</td>
<td>-10.65***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>manage</td>
<td>-0.113</td>
<td>-0.519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interurban</td>
<td>-0.410***</td>
<td>-0.221***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lanes</td>
<td>-0.00988</td>
<td>-0.0475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>heavy_vehl</td>
<td>-0.0103</td>
<td>-0.225***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP_pc</td>
<td>0.0615***</td>
<td>0.0497***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age_vehl</td>
<td>-0.00299</td>
<td>-0.0242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pop_2029</td>
<td>-0.00506***</td>
<td>0.0037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>alcohol_pc</td>
<td>-0.0465***</td>
<td>-0.0514***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pop_80</td>
<td>-0.0153</td>
<td>-0.00693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age_vehl</td>
<td>-0.209***</td>
<td>-0.268***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pop_20a29</td>
<td>-0.00751</td>
<td>-0.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln_vehi_km</td>
<td>-7.43e-07***</td>
<td>-1.32e-06***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln_r</td>
<td>0.262***</td>
<td>0.262***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln_s</td>
<td>1.441***</td>
<td>1.441***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lnalpha</td>
<td>0.210***</td>
<td>0.210***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>3918</td>
<td>3918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of groups</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>-37221.072</td>
<td>-13769.297</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Time dummies are not reported. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5. Regression models for accidents with victims and victims on management by road operator and quality of the road design.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Dependent Variable (ACV1)</th>
<th>Dependent Variable (VIC1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poison</td>
<td>NegBin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-12.70***</td>
<td>-10.84***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.115</td>
<td>-0.517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>private_h</td>
<td>-0.691***</td>
<td>-0.409***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0155</td>
<td>-0.0587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>private_l</td>
<td>0.0093***</td>
<td>0.146**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0132</td>
<td>-0.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>public_l</td>
<td>0.354***</td>
<td>0.252***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0106</td>
<td>-0.0594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interurban</td>
<td>-0.165***</td>
<td>-0.260***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0101</td>
<td>-0.063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lanes</td>
<td>0.0264***</td>
<td>0.0134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.00316</td>
<td>-0.0243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>heavy_vehi</td>
<td>-0.00930***</td>
<td>-0.00243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.000579</td>
<td>-0.00255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP_pc</td>
<td>1.09e-05***</td>
<td>0.000108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-1.571-06</td>
<td>-6.67e-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>alcohol_pc</td>
<td>-0.0301***</td>
<td>-0.0483***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.00158</td>
<td>-0.00682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age_vehi</td>
<td>-0.148***</td>
<td>-0.257***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.00751</td>
<td>-0.0321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pop_20u29</td>
<td>-1.14e-06</td>
<td>-1.61e-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-6.79e-08</td>
<td>-4.51e-07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pop_&gt;80</td>
<td>4.58e-06***</td>
<td>5.78e-06***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-1.98e-07</td>
<td>-1.35e-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rainy</td>
<td>0.000948***</td>
<td>-0.000378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.000162</td>
<td>-0.000721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln(vehkm)</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln_r</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ln_s</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lnalpha</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>3918</td>
<td>3918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of groups</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>-35897.563</td>
<td>-13739.078</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Time dummies are not reported. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Interestingly, the annual number of accidents with victims (acc_with) and the annual number of victims (vic) on highways that have high-quality of design (private_h and public_h) is lower under private management. This is what the statistically significant and negative coefficient tells us about the comparison between the private high-quality road and the public high-quality road. This result is consistent in all models regressed, providing first evidence of the road safety benefits of PPPs. When considering the coefficients associated with the highways of low-quality design (private_l and public_l), we observe that the expected number of victims (vic) is larger with respect to the low-quality public road, as expected. However, note that the coefficient of the privately managed low-quality road is substantially smaller than the coefficient associated with the low-quality publicly operated road, for the number of victims. Thus, we confirm that given the same quality of design, PPPs have a better safety performance when measured in terms of casualties (injuries and deaths). This result is not sustained when we measure the safety outcomes via the number of accidents with victims, given that the coefficients we obtain with the conditional fixed-effects model are roughly the same for the private and for the public low-quality roads.

Once we have described the effects of the core variable, we proceed to interpret the coefficients of the rest of the control variables. Relating to infrastructure characteristics, the number of accidents and victims decreases when the road highway is placed on the interurban environment (interurban). However, the more lanes the road highway has (lanes), the more accidents and victims are found. This effect is in line with Abdel-Aty and Radwan (2000) and Noland and Oh (2004). A large percentage of heavy vehicles (heavy_vehi) is related to more accidents and victims. This result may be explained by the fact that even though the average speed drops with more presence of heavy vehicles, trucks slow down the flow and safe distances are less respected. In the case of sudden braking the collision probability increases and as trucks are heavier than domestic vehicles the probability of victims also increases. This effect is in line with Jovanis and Chang (1986). The coefficient of the variable GDP per capita is positive and statistically significant in almost all the models reported. The number of accidents and victims increases in provinces with more GDP per capita suggesting that people who live in provinces that are richer are more risk prone because greater income is generally associated with more trips and movements. Accidents and victims
decrease with the annual liters of alcohol consumption per capita inside the home (alcohol_pc). This result is counterintuitive because it is expected that regions with greater alcohol consumption have more accidents. However, the coefficient of alcohol_pc is negative and statistically significant in all models regressed. This result may be related to the fact that the variable of alcohol consumption is specifically in the home. People who drink more inside the home may be more concerned about the dangers of alcohol impaired driving and may not take the same risks of drunk-driving. Unfortunately, we were unable to introduce a variable capturing the alcohol consumption outside the home. The variable age_vehi shows an unstable behavior: in some models it is statistically significant and positive, while in other model regressions it is statistically significant and negative. These results make it difficult to obtain clear conclusions, however there is significant evidence that the average age of vehicle fleets has some effect on road safety outcomes. The demographic variables pop_20a29 and pop_>80 have been employed as a proxy for people’s driving behavior. The number of accidents and victims decreases in provinces with a young driving population but increases with an older cohort of population. The coefficient associated with the variable rainy is positive and statistically significant. The number of accidents and victims increases in control stations where more rainy days are registered. This effect is in line with Hermans et al. (2006) and Caliendo et al. (2007).

6. CONCLUSIONS

In this paper we provide the first evidence of the role of road management models on road safety outcomes for a national highway network. After confirming that highways with high quality road design are safer than those with low quality road design, disregarding the management model and realizing that a true comparison between management models must consider homogeneous design quality, we found heterogeneous effects depending on whether the management of the road was private or public. Our results show that privately operated roads perform better in terms of road safety outcomes than publicly operated roads for the high-quality standard (road design) highways. The annual number of accidents with victims and the annual number of victims on highways is
lower under Public-Private Partnerships. Results are also favorable for private operators on highways with low quality road design, but only in the case of the number of victims. The differences between road management models in low-quality roads is not statistically significant for the number of accidents, so we should be cautious about the implications of our results on the superiority of private management for this kind of road.

These findings are important in several ways. Firstly, in order to promote road safety the infrastructure should support high road design characteristics. The design and initial construction are crucial because once the road is built it is very costly and difficult to modify the geometrical design. Thus, our results indicate that beyond the road management model, the most important factor in determining road safety outcomes is the quality standard of the road infrastructure.

Secondly, for the same quality standard, we found that private highways show better road safety outcomes. It is necessary to understand the reasons behind this fact. That may feed an interesting line of future research. On the one hand, it may imply that private operators take actions or decisions that favor road safety, which may provide arguments for going private. On the other hand, public operators might learn from the better actions and performance of private operators in order to improve their outcomes, without going private. In any case, further research should focus on the management differences of private and public operators to better understand these safety implications.
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Raymond, J. I. (GEAP); Roig, J. I. (GEAP)
“Una propuesta de evaluación de las externalidades de capital humano en la empresa”
(Abril 2007)

XREAP2007-03
Durán, J. M. (IEB); Esteller, A. (IEB)
“An empirical analysis of wealth taxation: Equity vs. Tax compliance”
(Juny 2007)

XREAP2007-04
Matas, A. (GEAP); Raymond, J. I. (GEAP)
“Cross-section data, disequilibrium situations and estimated coefficients: evidence from car ownership demand”
(Juny 2007)

XREAP2007-05
Jofre-Montseny, J. (IEB); Solé-Ollé, A. (IEB)
“Tax differentials and agglomeration economies in intraregional firm location”
(Juny 2007)

XREAP2007-06
Álvarez-Albeo, C. (CREB); Hernández-Martín, R.
“Explaining high economic growth in small tourism countries with a dynamic general equilibrium model”
(Juliol 2007)

XREAP2007-07
Duch, N. (IEB); Montolio, D. (IEB); Mediavilla, M.
“Evaluating the impact of public subsidies on a firm’s performance: a quasi-experimental approach”
(Juliol 2007)

XREAP2007-08
Segarra-Blasco, A. (GRIT)
“Innovation sources and productivity: a quantile regression analysis”
(Octubre 2007)

XREAP2007-09
Albalate, D. (PPRE-IREA)
“Shifting death to their Alternatives: The case of Toll Motorways”
(Octubre 2007)

XREAP2007-10
Segarra-Blasco, A. (GRIT); García-Quevedo, J. (IEB); Teruel-Carrizosa, M. (GRIT)
“Barriers to innovation and public policy in Catalonia”
(Novembre 2007)

XREAP2007-11
Bel, G. (PPRE-IREA); Foote, J.
“Comparison of recent toll road concession transactions in the United States and France”
(Novembre 2007)

XREAP2007-12
Segarra-Blasco, A. (GRIT)
“Innovation, R&D spillovers and productivity: the role of knowledge-intensive services”
(Novembre 2007)
XREAP2007-13
Bermúdez Morata, Ll. (RFA-IREA); Guillén Estany, M. (RFA-IREA), Solé Auró, A. (RFA-IREA)
“Impacto de la inmigración sobre la esperanza de vida en salud y en discapacidad de la población española”
(Novembre 2007)

XREAP2007-14
Calaeys, P. (AQR-IREA); Ramos, R. (AQR-IREA), Suriñach, J. (AQR-IREA)
“Fiscal sustainability across government tiers”
(Desembre 2007)

XREAP2007-15
Sánchez Hugalbe, A. (IEB)
“Influencia de la inmigración en la elección escolar”
(Desembre 2007)

2008

XREAP2008-01
Durán Weitkamp, C. (GRIT); Martín Bofarull, M. (GRIT) ; Pablo Martí, F.
“Economic effects of road accessibility in the Pyrenees: User perspective”
(Gener 2008)

XREAP2008-02
Díaz-Serrano, L.; Stoyanova, A. P. (CREB)
“The Causal Relationship between Individual’s Choice Behavior and Self-Reported Satisfaction: the Case of Residential Mobility in the EU”
(Marc 2008)

XREAP2008-03
Matas, A. (GEAP); Raymond, J. L. (GEAP); Roig, J. L. (GEAP)
“Car ownership and access to jobs in Spain”
(Abril 2008)

XREAP2008-04
Bel, G. (PPRE-IREA) ; Fageda, X. (PPRE-IREA)
“Privatization and competition in the delivery of local services: An empirical examination of the dual market hypothesis”
(Abril 2008)

XREAP2008-05
Matas, A. (GEAP); Raymond, J. L. (GEAP); Roig, J. L. (GEAP)
“Job accessibility and employment probability”
(Maig 2008)

XREAP2008-06
Basher, S. A.; Carrión, J. LL (AQR-IREA)
Deconstructing Shocks and Persistence in OECD Real Exchange Rates
(Juny 2008)

XREAP2008-07
Sanromà, E. (IEB); Ramos, R. (AQR-IREA); Simón, H.
Portabilidad del capital humano y asimilación de los inmigrantes. Evidencia para España
(Juliol 2008)

XREAP2008-08
Basher, S. A.; Carrión, J. LL (AQR-IREA)
Price level convergence, purchasing power parity and multiple structural breaks: An application to US cities
(Juliol 2008)

XREAP2008-09
Bermúdez, Ll. (RFA-IREA)
A priori ratemaking using bivariate poisson regression models
(Juliol 2008)
XREAP2008-10
Solé-Ollé, A. (IEB), HORTAS RICO, M. (IEB)
Does urban sprawl increase the costs of providing local public services? Evidence from Spanish municipalities
(Novembre 2008)

XREAP2008-11
TERUEL-CARRIZOSA, M. (GRIT), SEGARRA-BLASCO, A. (GRIT)
Immigration and Firm Growth: Evidence from Spanish cities
(Novembre 2008)

XREAP2008-12
Duch-Brown, N. (IEB), GARCÍA-QUEVEDO, J. (IEB), MONTOLIO, D. (IEB)
Assessing the assignation of public subsidies: Do the experts choose the most efficient R&D projects?
(Novembre 2008)

XREAP2008-13
Bilotkach, V., Fageda, X. (PPRE-IREA), Flores-Fillol, R.
Scheduled service versus personal transportation: the role of distance
(Desembre 2008)

XREAP2008-14
Albalate, D. (PPRE-IREA), Gel, G. (PPRE-IREA)
Tourism and urban transport: Holding demand pressure under supply constraints
(Desembre 2008)

2009

XREAP2009-01
Calonge, S. (CREB); TEJADA, O.
“A theoretical and practical study on linear reforms of dual taxes”
(Febrer 2009)

XREAP2009-02
Albalate, D. (PPRE-IREA); Fernández-Villadangos, L. (PPRE-IREA)
“Exploring Determinants of Urban Motorcycle Accident Severity: The Case of Barcelona”
(Març 2009)

XREAP2009-03
Borrell, J. R. (PPRE-IREA); Fernández-Villadangos, L. (PPRE-IREA)
“Assessing excess profits from different entry regulations”
(Abril 2009)

XREAP2009-04
Sanromá, E. (IEB); Ramos, R. (AQR-IREA), Simon, H.
“Los salarios de los inmigrantes en el mercado de trabajo español. ¿Importa el origen del capital humano?”
(Abril 2009)

XREAP2009-05
Jiménez, J. L.; Perdiguero, J. (PPRE-IREA)
“(No)competition in the Spanish retailing gasoline market: a variance filter approach”
(Maig 2009)

XREAP2009-06
“International trade as the sole engine of growth for an economy”
(Juny 2009)

XREAP2009-07
Callejón, M. (PPRE-IREA), Ortún V, M.
“The Black Box of Business Dynamics”
(Setembre 2009)

XREAP2009-08
Lucena, A. (CREB)
“The antecedents and innovation consequences of organizational search: empirical evidence for Spain”
(Octubre 2009)
XREAP2009-09
Domènech Campmajó, L. (PPRE-IREA)
“Competition between TV Platforms”
(Octubre 2009)

XREAP2009-10
Solé-Auró, A. (RFA-IREA), Guillén, M. (RFA-IREA), Crimmins, E. M.
“Health care utilization among immigrants and native-born populations in 11 European countries. Results from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe”
(Octubre 2009)

XREAP2009-11
Segarra, A. (GRIT), Teruel, M. (GRIT)
“Small firms, growth and financial constraints”
(Octubre 2009)

XREAP2009-12
Matas, A. (GEAP), Raymond, J.L. (GEAP), Ruiz, A. (GEAP)
“Traffic forecasts under uncertainty and capacity constraints”
(Novembre 2009)

XREAP2009-13
Soler-OLLé, A. (IEB)
“Inter-regional redistribution through infrastructure investment: tactical or programmatic?”
(Novembre 2009)

XREAP2009-14
Del Barrio-Castro, T., García-Quevedo, J. (IEB)
“The determinants of university patenting: Do incentives matter?”
(Novembre 2009)

XREAP2009-15
Ramos, R. (AQR-IREA), Suriñach, J. (AQR-IREA), Artís, M. (AQR-IREA)
“Human capital spillovers, productivity and regional convergence in Spain”
(Novembre 2009)

XREAP2009-16
Álvarez-Albelo, C. D. (CREB), Hernández-Martín, R.
“The commons and anti-commons problems in the tourism economy”
(Desembre 2009)

2010

XREAP2010-01
García-López, M. A. (GEAP)
“The Accessibility City. When Transport Infrastructure Matters in Urban Spatial Structure”
(Febrer 2010)

XREAP2010-02
García-Quevedo, J. (IEB), Mas-Verdú, F. (IEB), Polo-Otero, J. (IEB)
“Which firms want PhDs? The effect of the university-industry relationship on the PhD labour market”
(Març 2010)

XREAP2010-03
Pitt, D., Guillén, M. (RFA-IREA)
“An introduction to parametric and non-parametric models for bivariate positive insurance claim severity distributions”
(Març 2010)

XREAP2010-04
Bermúdez, Ll. (RFA-IREA), Karlis, D.
“Modelling dependence in a ratemaking procedure with multivariate Poisson regression models”
(Abril 2010)

XREAP2010-05
Di Paola, A. (IEB)
“Parental education and family characteristics: educational opportunities across cohorts in Italy and Spain”
(Maig 2010)

XREAP2010-06
Simón, H. (IEB), Ramos, R. (AQR-IREA), Sanromá, E. (IEB)
“Movilidad ocupacional de les immigrents en una economia de bassas cualificacions. El cas de Espanya”
(Juny 2010)

XREAP2010-07
Di Paolo, A. (GEAP & IEB), Raymond, J. Ll. (GEAP & IEB)
“Language knowledge and earnings in Catalonia”
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“Prediction of the economic cost of individual long-term care in the Spanish population”
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XREAP2010-09
Di Paolo, A. (GEAP & IEB)
“Knowledge of catalan, public/private sector choice and earnings: Evidence from a double sample selection model”
(Setembre 2010)

XREAP2010-10
Coad, A., Segarra, A. (GRIT), Teruel, M. (GRIT)
“Like milk or wine: Does firm performance improve with age?”
(Setembre 2010)

XREAP2010-11
Di Paolo, A. (GEAP & IEB), Raymond, J. Ll. (GEAP & IEB), Calero, J. (IEB)
“Exploring educational mobility in Europe”
(Octubre 2010)

XREAP2010-12
Borrell, A. (GiM-IREA), Fernández-Villadangos, L. (GiM-IREA)
“Clustering or scattering: the underlying reason for regulating distance among retail outlets”
(Desembre 2010)

XREAP2010-13
Di Paolo, A. (GEAP & IEB)
“School composition effects in Spain”
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Fageda, X. (GiM-IREA), Flores-Fillol, R.
“Technology, Business Models and Network Structure in the Airline Industry”
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Albalate, D. (GiM-IREA), Bel, G. (GiM-IREA), Fageda, X. (GiM-IREA)
“Is it Redistribution or Centralization? On the Determinants of Government Investment in Infrastructure”
(Desembre 2010)

XREAP2010-16
Oppedisano, V., Turati, G.
“What are the causes of educational inequalities and of their evolution over time in Europe? Evidence from PISA”
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XREAP2010-17
Canova, L., Vaglio, A.
“Why do educated mothers matter? A model of parental help”
(Desembre 2010)

2011

XREAP2011-01
Fageda, X. (GiM-IREA), Perdiguer, J. (GiM-IREA)
“An empirical analysis of a merger between a network and low-cost airlines”
(Maig 2011)
XREAP2011-02
Moreno-Torres, I. (ACCO, CRES & GiM-IREA)
“What if there was a stronger pharmaceutical price competition in Spain? When regulation has a similar effect to collusion”
(Maig 2011)

XREAP2011-03
Miguélez, E. (AQR-IREA); Gómez-Miguélez, I.
“Singling out individual inventors from patent data”
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XREAP2011-04
Moreno-Torres, I. (ACCO, CRES & GiM-IREA)
“Generic drugs in Spain: price competition vs. moral hazard”
(Maig 2011)

XREAP2011-05
Nieto, S. (AQR-IREA), Ramos, R. (AQR-IREA)
“¿Afecta la sobreeducación de los padres al rendimiento académico de sus hijos?”
(Maig 2011)

XREAP2011-06
Pitt, D., Guillén, M. (RFA-IREA), Bolancé, C. (RFA-IREA)
“Estimation of Parametric and Nonparametric Models for Univariate Claim Severity Distributions - an approach using R”
(Juny 2011)

XREAP2011-07
Guillén, M. (RFA-IREA), Comas-Herrera, A.
“How much risk is mitigated by LTC Insurance? A case study of the public system in Spain”
(Juny 2011)

XREAP2011-08
Ayuso, M. (RFA-IREA), Guillén, M. (RFA-IREA), Bolancé, C. (RFA-IREA)
“Loss risk through fraud in car insurance”
(Juny 2011)

XREAP2011-09
Duch-Brown, N. (IEB), García-Quevedo, J. (IEB), Montolio, D. (IEB)
“The link between public support and private R&D effort: What is the optimal subsidy?”
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XREAP2011-10
Bermúdez, Ll. (RFA-IREA), Karlis, D.
“Mixture of bivariate Poisson regression models with an application to insurance”
(Juliol 2011)

XREAP2011-11
Varela-Irimia, X.-L. (GRIT)
“Age effects, unobserved characteristics and hedonic price indexes: The Spanish car market in the 1990s”
(Àgost 2011)

XREAP2011-12
Bermúdez, Ll. (RFA-IREA), Ferri, A. (RFA-IREA), Guillén, M. (RFA-IREA)
“A correlation sensitivity analysis of non-life underwriting risk in solvency capital requirement estimation”
(Setembre 2011)

XREAP2011-13
“A logistic regression approach to estimating customer profit loss due to lapses in insurance”
(Octubre 2011)

XREAP2011-14
Jiménez, J. L., Perdiguer, J. (GiM-IREA), García, C.
“Evaluation of subsidies programs to sell green cars: Impact on prices, quantities and efficiency”
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Arespa, M. (CREB)
“A New Open Economy Macroeconomic Model with Endogenous Portfolio Diversification and Firms Entry”
(Octubre 2011)

XREAP2011-16
Matas, A. (GEAP), Raymond, J. L. (GEAP), Roig, J.L. (GEAP)
“The impact of agglomeration effects and accessibility on wages”
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XREAP2011-17
Segarra, A. (GRIT)
“R&D cooperation between Spanish firms and scientific partners: what is the role of tertiary education?”
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García-Pérez, J. I.; Hidalgo-Hidalgo, M.; Robles-Zurita, J. A.
“Does grade retention affect achievement? Some evidence from PISA”
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Arespa, M. (CREB)
“Macroeconomics of extensive margins: a simple model”
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García-Quevedo, J. (IEB), Pellegrino, G. (IEB), Vivarelli, M.
“The determinants of YICs’ R&D activity”
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González-Val, R. (IEB), Olmo, J.
“Growth in a Cross-Section of Cities: Location, Increasing Returns or Random Growth?”
(Desembre 2011)

XREAP2011-22
Gombau, V. (GRIT), Segarra, A. (GRIT)
“The Innovation and Imitation Dichotomy in Spanish firms: do absorptive capacity and the technological frontier matter?”
(Desembre 2011)

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XREAP2012-01
Borrell, J. R. (GiM-IREA), Jiménez, J. L., García, C.
“Evaluating Antitrust Leniency Programs”
(Gener 2012)

XREAP2012-02
Ferri, A. (RFA-IREA), Guillén, M. (RFA-IREA), Bermúdez, Ll. (RFA-IREA)
“Solvency capital estimation and risk measures”
(Gener 2012)

XREAP2012-03
Ferri, A. (RFA-IREA), Bermúdez, Ll. (RFA-IREA), Guillén, M. (RFA-IREA)
“How to use the standard model with own data”
(Febrer 2012)

XREAP2012-04
Perdiguero, J. (GiM-IREA), Borrell, J.R. (GiM-IREA)
“Driving competition in local gasoline markets”
(Març 2012)

XREAP2012-05
D’Amico, G., Guillem, M. (RFA-IREA), Manca, R.
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XREAP2012-06
Bové-Sans, M. A. (GRIT), Laguado-Ramírez, R.
“Quantitative analysis of image factors in a cultural heritage tourist destination”
(Abril 2012)

XREAP2012-07
“Changes in wage structure in Mexico going beyond the mean: An analysis of differences in distribution, 1987-2008”
(Maig 2012)

XREAP2012-08
“What underlies localization and urbanization economies? Evidence from the location of new firms”
(Maig 2012)

XREAP2012-09
Muñiz, I. (GEAP), Calatayud, D., Dobaño, R.
“Los límites de la compacidad urbana como instrumento a favor de la sostenibilidad. La hipótesis de la compensación en Barcelona medida a través de la huella ecológica de la movilidad y la vivienda”
(Maig 2012)

XREAP2012-10
Arqué-Castells, P. (GEAP), Mohnen, P.
“Sunk costs, extensive R&D subsidies and permanent inducement effects”
(Maig 2012)

XREAP2012-11
Boj, E. (CREB), Delicado, P., Fortiana, J., Esteve, A., Caballé, A.
“Local Distance-Based Generalized Linear Models using the dbstats package for R”
(Maig 2012)

XREAP2012-12
Royuela, V. (AQR-IREA)
“What about people in European Regional Science?”
(Maig 2012)

XREAP2012-13
Osorio A. M. (RFA-IREA), Bolancé, C. (RFA-IREA), Madise, N.
“Intermediary and structural determinants of early childhood health in Colombia: exploring the role of communities”
(Juny 2012)

XREAP2012-14
Miguelez. E. (AQR-IREA), Moreno, R. (AQR-IREA)
“Do labour mobility and networks foster geographical knowledge diffusion? The case of European regions”
(Juliol 2012)

XREAP2012-15
Teixidó-Figuera, J. (GRIT), Duró, J. A. (GRIT)
“Ecological Footprint Inequality: A methodological review and some results”
(Setembre 2012)

XREAP2012-16
Varela-Irimia, X-L. (GRIT)
“Profitability, uncertainty and multi-product firm product proliferation: The Spanish car industry”
(Setembre 2012)

XREAP2012-17
Duró, J. A. (GRIT), Teixidó-Figuera, J. (GRIT)
“Ecological Footprint Inequality across countries: the role of environment intensity, income and interaction effects”
(Octubre 2012)

XREAP2012-18
Manresa, A. (CREB), Sancho, F.
“Leontief versus Ghosh: two faces of the same coin”
(Octubre 2012)
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<td>“Nonparametric estimation of Value-at-Risk”</td>
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<td>“Informality and overeducation in the labor market of a developing country”</td>
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<td>“Financial constraints and the failure of innovation projects”</td>
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<td>“Social Determinants of Child Health in Colombia: Can Community Education Moderate the Effect of Family Characteristics?“</td>
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<td>“An Analysis of Black-box Optimization Problems in Reinsurance: Evolutionary-based Approaches”</td>
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<td>“Prevalence of alcohol-impaired drivers based on random breath tests in a roadside survey”</td>
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<td>“How market access shapes human capital investment in a peripheral country”</td>
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<td>“The Impact of Cooperation on R&amp;D, Innovation and Productivity: an Analysis of Spanish Manufacturing and Services Firms”</td>
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<td>“Testing extreme value copulas to estimate the quantile”</td>
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